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Abstract  
The effectiveness and creativity of Linux, Wikipedia and a plethora of other distributed innovation 
systems has attracted the attention of scholars, practitioners and policy makers. The hallmark of these 
distributed innovation systems is that value creation transcends the boundaries of hierarchically 
organized firms. To date, only relatively few studies have focused on the organization design of 
distributed innovation systems. This conceptual paper addresses this lacuna by asking: How does 
organization design structure relationships in distributed innovation systems, including interactions 
between the “visible hand” of the manager and the “crowd” of distributed innovation? The purpose 
of this paper is to shift the unit of analysis of organization design from the individual firm to 
networks of actors providing a framework to study how design organizes distributed innovation 
systems. In order to do so three design mechanisms (interface design; the design of participatory 
architectures; and the design of evaluative infrastructures) are proposed through which firms and 
other network actors organize their encounter in “the open” and through which they manage 
communication, coordination of tasks and control in distributed innovation systems.  
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The imperatives of technology and organization, not the images of ideology,  
are what determine the shape of economic society. 
 
John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967) 
 
 
Introduction: The visible hand and the crowd 
Distributed innovation systems have emerged as powerful and creative sources of new ideas, services 
and technologies. For instance, thousands of amateur contributors make Wikipedia the most 
comprehensive encyclopedia in the world. The open source codebase Linux provides sophisticated 
software, used even for what the U.S. government terms mission critical tasks. Since the start of 
Apple’s open App Store, approximately 1.5 million applications have been developed by close to 
400,000 publishers and downloaded 75 billion times. In the first week of 2015 alone customers spent 
nearly half a billion dollars on apps and in-app purchases.2 These examples illustrate how distributed 
actors in innovation networks act effectively as producers and bricoleurs, creative users and 
(occasionally) abusers of new products, services and experiences. Taking these shifting locus of 
innovation from firms to networks (Powell et al., 1996) as its point of departure, this paper focuses 
on one hitherto neglected question: How does organization design, defined as the structuring of 
communication, coordination and control (Simon, 1969, 1962) enable as well as constrain the 
activities within distributed innovation networks? 
 
Save for a few exceptions (Baldwin, 2012; Gulati et al., 2012: Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Lakhani et al., 
2013; Altman et al., 2015), extant research does not focus sufficiently on organization design and its 
                                                 
2 See http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/ and 
https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2015/01/08App-Store-Rings-in-2015-with-New-Records.html 
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role in structuring relationships within distributed innovation systems, including those between 
hierarchical firms, individual entrepreneurs, collectives and other actors. As Baldwin observed in the 
context of distributed innovation, “the so-called ‘modern corporation’ has long been the central 
focus of the field of organization design. […] But individual organizations are no longer adequate to 
serve as the primary unit of analysis” (2012: 1). Therein lies the challenge this paper addresses: How 
to extend theory of organization design beyond firm boundaries and explicate how organization 
design mechanisms structure systems of distributed innovation?  
 
This paper provides an answer to this question by proposing a novel conceptualization of 
organization design that explores how communication, coordination and control are achieved in 
distributed innovation systems. Complementing theories of design for hierarchies and markets 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991), this paper makes a specific contribution to organization theory through 
mapping a framework for organization design in distributed innovation systems. In order to do so 
this paper proposes three concrete design principles that resolve challenges of communication, 
coordination and control in distributed innovation systems. First, interface design is concerned with 
the organization of the interaction within distributed innovation systems (mediating function); 
second, the design of participatory architectures enables users to articulate their ideas and contribute 
meaningfully to distributed innovation (enabling function); and, third, evaluative infrastructures 
function as accounting mechanisms to judge the quality and value of production in distributed 
innovation systems (valuation function). In so doing this paper provides one step towards answering 
Boudreau and Lakhani’s call that we need to “put as much energy and intelligence into designing 
systems for organizing work outside company walls as we do for work within them” (2013: 69). 
 
The proposed theoretization of organization design advances our understanding of organizing 
crowds and innovation in several ways. First, it offers a better understanding of the design 
mechanisms that structure distributed innovation processes. Akin to Ford’s assembly line that 
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represented an organizational innovation for manufacturing physical goods (Weber, 2004), the 
proposed design principles represent an invisible infrastructure that organizes economic activity in 
distributed innovation systems. Second, this paper contributes to the development of a design-based 
theory of search in distributed innovation systems (Simon, 1969). Third, it adds to the resource-based 
literature by explicating how organization design functions as an access mechanism to knowledge, 
creativity, human ingenuity and other resources that reside outside firm boundaries.  
  
The paper is structured as follows. First, it analyzes research on distributed innovation and situates its 
argument within this ongoing conversation. Next it discusses the conceptualization of organization 
design along three main trajectories (interface design, design of architectures of participation and 
design of evaluative infrastructures). This section draws on and enhances the interdisciplinary 
discourse of organization theory by grounding the three functions of organization design analytically 
in software and media studies (concern with interfaces), the distributed innovation literature (concern 
with architectures) and economic sociology and accounting studies (concern with valuation). Then 
the paper discusses the implications for organization theory, search and the resource based view. 
Finally, it reflects on future empirical research opportunities and concludes with a reflection on 
management practice and the political economy of distributed innovation.    
 
Theoretical context: distributed innovation and the question of organization design   
Next this paper will review extant research on distributed innovation in order to locate the paper’s 
theoretical context, clarify the domain of applicability of the proposed framework as well as indicate 
where and how it departs from previous studies.  
 
Defining distributed innovation systems      
Several different conceptualizations of the phenomenon of distributed innovation compete for the 
scholar’s attention, including user driven innovation (von Hippel, 2005), commons-based peer 
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production (Benkler, 2002), platform innovation (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; 2008), co-creation 
(Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004), crowdsourcing (Afuah and Tucci, 2012, 2013; Bloodgood, 2013) 
and other forms of collaboration with outsiders (see table 1).  
 
 
 
These approaches share the assumption that the “locus of innovation” shifts from hierarchically 
structured firms to networks of distributed actors (Powell, 1990; Powell et al., 1996), theorizing 
innovation as a distributed process to which users, rivals and other non-firm members contribute 
(von Hippel, 1988; Lakhani and Panetta, 2007; Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Bogers and West, 
2012). These approaches define distributed innovation as “decentralized problem-solving, self-
selected participation, self-organizing coordination and collaboration, ‘free’ revealing of knowledge, 
and hybrid organizational models that blend community with commercial success” (Lakhani and 
Panetta, 2007: 98). The constitutive elements include crowdsourcing, contests and tournaments as 
forms of distributed innovation (see Pisano and Verganti, 2008; Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009; 2013) 
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which together define the domain of applicability for the organization design framework of 
distributed innovation developed in this paper.3   
 
Importantly, the role of information and communication technology in distributed innovation 
systems has to be acknowledged (see Zammuto et al., 2007; Lakhani et al., 2013; Altman et al., 2015). 
Knowledge and informational goods can be digitized and travel through the internet via a rapidly 
spreading infrastructure of socio-cognitive processing devices, including PCs, laptops, smartphones, 
tablets and so on (Lakhani et al., 2013). The shared information is transmitted, stored and 
manipulated at ever declining costs and at ever increasing speeds. Past technology advances such as 
filing systems, phones, fax machines, etc. have contributed to an increase in the internal efficiency of 
organizations (Yates, 1989). This has led to a decrease in management costs. The internet, on the 
other hand, is a technology that networks society and, hence, reduces communication, information 
and search costs (Langlois, 2003; Langlois and Garzarelli, 2005; Altman et al., 2015). Questions 
concerning how to find the right supplier to deliver crucial input just in time become, thanks to 
technology, easier to answer. Firms such as Procter & Gamble search globally for talent to help solve 
the challenges it faces or to identify new opportunities; similarly, Innocentive is an open platform for 
crowdsourcing solutions for problems experienced in the pharmaceutical industry (Huston and 
Sakkab, 2006; see also Pisano and Verganti, 2008; Boudreau and Lakhani, 2013). These examples 
                                                 
3 The definition excludes open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) because it is predominantly concerned 
with commercialization of distributed innovation from a firm perspective (Lichtenthaler, 2011) and 
revenue-generating practices form a firm perspective (Bogers and West, 2012). Open innovation is 
defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, 2006: 
1). Consequently, open innovation studies focus on value capturing mechanisms that enable “the 
organization to sustain its position in the industry value chain over time” (Chesbrough, 2006: 2; see 
also Chesbrough, 2003; Fosfuri et al., 2008). In contrast, distributed innovation systems shift the 
analytical focus from firms, industries and value chains to networks and business ecosystems.  
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demonstrate that technology not only helps to reduce related communication, information and 
search costs but also provides a superior mechanism to access talent and identify resources. Hence, 
technology provides the informational infrastructure for distributed innovation to occur.   
 
Having said that, it is important to note that technology does not determine action within networks 
(Brynjolfsson, 1993). Rather, technologies afford (Gibson, 1977) "action possibilities" which are 
latent in their design without determining them (Orlikowski, 1992; Callon, 1987). Following this 
view, technology constitutes a space of possibilities; it is the task of organization design to transform 
these possibilities into actualities by structuring communication, coordination and control in 
distributed innovation systems. What then do we know about organization design of distributed 
innovation systems?   
 
The research question: design of distributed innovation systems   
Important works on motivation (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von Krogh et al., 2012), leadership and 
governance mechanisms (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; Fleming and Waguespack, 2007), forms of 
institutional work as logics and professional identities shift from firm-based to open models (Gawer 
and Phillips, 2013; Lifshitz-Assaf, 2015), boundary processes (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2012; West 
and O’Mahony, 2008; Lakhani et al., 2013), relative openness and closure (West, 2003; Boudreau, 
2012) and communities, socialization processes and power (Ducheneaut, 2005; Jarvenpaa et al., 2013; 
O’Mahony and Lakhani, 2011) have significantly deepened our understanding of the possibilities of 
managing distributed innovation strategically. These literatures share a concern with the managerial 
challenge of making use of distributed innovation and with the organizational challenge to develop 
absorptive capacity to appropriate external knowledge. 
 
However, only relatively few studies have explicitly focused on the design mechanisms that structure 
communication, coordination and control in distributed innovation systems (see Baldwin, 2012; 
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Gulati et al., 2012: Fjeldstad et al., 2012). Despite the shifting locus of innovation from firms towards 
networks, Gulati et al. (2012: 572) stated that 
 
“our theories of organization design, with their strong intrafirm bias, continue to emphasize 
elements like formal authority […], the design of incentives like salary, bonuses, benefits, and 
promotion opportunities, and the collocation of individuals performing highly interdependent 
tasks.” (Gulati et al., 2012: 572)  
 
The authors argued that the increase in collaboration with distributed external actors challenges this 
theoretization of design, with the consequence that “an emphasis on intrafirm design may be out of 
date, at the very least, incomplete.” (Gulati et al., 2012: 572). This diagnosis echoes Baldwin’s (2012: 
1) above quoted statement that individual organizations are “no longer adequate to serve as the 
primary unit of analysis”. Indeed, as firms “shrink their core” and “expand their periphery” (Gulati 
and Kletter, 2005) the question of the design of collaborative processes becomes increasingly 
pertinent.   
   
Whilst the literature on design of distributed innovation systems has articulated this challenge it has 
remained caught in a firm-centric perspective. For instance, Gulati et al. (2012: 582) introduced the 
notion of meta-organization which describes a cluster of legally autonomous firms or individuals that 
can be analyzed and designed as an organization. Their argument borrows much form the traditional 
hierarchical design thinking the paper aims to leave behind. Gulati et al.’s discussion of the two 
dimensions of meta-organization design – permeability of boundaries and stratification – serves as 
illustration. The question of boundaries is framed as decisions about granting membership to the 
meta-organization (2012: 576). The authors then discuss degrees of stratification within the meta-
organization such as the control span as hierarchical design choice: “Like hierarchies in traditional 
organizations, tiering serves to specify spans of control within meta-organizations.” (2012: 578). 
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Whilst traditional organization design supposed a manager-architect that engineered the relationships 
between individual employees, it is now the “focal firm” that plays the role of the system architect, 
shaping relationships amongst suppliers, partners and other network members. The corollary of 
Gulati et al.’s approach is that open communities are analytically distinguished by what they are 
lacking in comparison to hierarchically organized firms: boundaries towards the environment and 
internal stratification. Rather than investigating the specific processes that structure distributed 
innovation networks in which authorship of ideas, and by extension authority over the network, are 
distributed, the ideas put forward by Gulati et al. (2012) extend traditional firm-based design 
thinking.  
 
Similarly, the notion of the actor-oriented design scheme proposed by Fjeldstad and his colleagues 
(2012) borrows much from the traditional organization design literature they criticize. For instance, 
discussing Accenture as case of an architecture of collaboration (2012: 740-741) the authors identify 
long-term development and training of staff, the IT-based internal knowledge management system, 
and general knowledge sharing between staff as critical design elements of the actor-oriented 
architectural scheme. The authors conclude that the characteristic feature of this and other examples 
is “that the locus of control and coordination mechanisms is the organizational actor.” (2012: 744). 
Following this perspective, the shifting locus of innovation is accompanied with the affirmation of 
the firm as steady locus of design and control.  
 
The critique of firm-centricity extends to much of the literature on design of distributed innovation 
systems, including studies on the design of platform innovation. For instance, in Gawer and 
Henderson’s (2007) influential work on platform leadership, design is understood quite traditionally 
as the internal structuring of a firm (in their case, specifically job design at Intel; see Gawer, 2010: 
292). Similarly, research on orchestration in network-centric innovation processes focused on 
leadership rather than design (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011). For 
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instance, Dhanaraj and Parkhe assumed that “the head cattle lead[s] the herd” thanks to superior 
managerial abilities (2006: 659). Such metaphorical framing re-captures if not the locus of innovation 
so at least the locus of control into the visible hand of the manager. 
 
This points towards the problematic assumption in extant research that this paper addresses: research 
focused on design choices articulates the challenges of design in distributed innovation systems from 
a firm-centric perspective; yet a theory of organization design in distributed networks needs to 
provide a specific framework for understanding those mechanisms that structure decentralized 
innovation processes. It is the purpose of this paper to explicate such a framework, showing how 
design mediates the relationships between the “visible hand” of the manager and the “crowd” of 
unruly producer-consumers and other external contributors.  
 
Note that such a framework does not make a-priori assumptions about the actors in or designers of 
distributed innovation networks: actors may include entrepreneurial individuals (e.g. Linus Torvalds), 
collectives (e.g. Wikipedia), crowds (e.g. TopCoder) or firms (e.g. Apple) that form elements of the 
distributed innovation system. The design principles that structure network relations merely describe 
how the pivotal tasks of communication, coordination and control between these heterarchical sub-
systems are accomplished. In this sense, individuals, collectives and firms are treated as elements 
(nodes) within the network that engage with each other through interfaces, participatory architectures 
and evaluative infrastructures. The authors of these interfaces, participatory architectures and 
evaluative infrastructures may include, but are not limited to, firms that seek to impose their designs 
on the “crowd”. Alternatively, authorship might be shared between different actors and shift over 
time as design schemes evolve. Whilst these are important questions for future empirical research 
(see concluding section), this paper focuses on the principle design mechanisms that organize 
innovation networks.    
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The next section explicates in detail the three design mechanisms that structure distributed 
innovation systems: interface design (mediating function); the design of architectures of participation 
(enabling function); and the design of evaluative infrastructures (valuation function). Akin to Baldwin 
and Clark’s (2000) design rules for evolvable technical systems, these three dimensions of 
organization design in “the open” represent a complete set as they address the three fundamental 
concerns of organization design: interaction between elements; task differentiation and integration; 
and feedback (Simon, 1962).        
 
Design principles for organizing distributed innovation 
Design has been one of the key concerns for organization theorists (Simon, 1969; Perrow, 1967; 
March and Simon, 1958). As Dunbar and Starbuck (2006) suggested, traditionally, design has 
revolved around the notions of “alignment, congruence and fit” between the demands of an external 
environment and the internal parameters at the disposal of the manager, such as people, architecture, 
routines and culture (Roberts, 2004). Following this view, organization design is the internal response 
to the strategic choices of management, which in turn are determined by environmental constraints 
and opportunities (Chandler, 1962; Altman et al., 2015).  
 
Distributed innovation problematizes organization design differently. It suggests shifting the unit of 
analysis from the individual firm to networks of actors and their relationships. As Baldwin (2012: 1) 
argued, “the key problem for organization design will be the management of distributed innovation” 
and the integration of diverse entities into coherent networks of value production. Because in 
distributed innovation systems the division of labor cuts across organizational boundaries and 
production feeds on multiple, distributed agents, the question of design cannot be understood as an 
internal organizational response to strategic choices. Rather, organization design co-evolves with 
distributed innovation. Take the example of Apple and its iPhone application ecology (see also 
Lakhani et al., 2012). Hundreds of thousands of applications are developed by external parties and 
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sold via Apple’s App Store. To a large degree, the experienced value and functional versatility of the 
iPhone results from the creativity of the distributed innovation systems surrounding it. Since the 
creation of innovative applications (including their marketing) occurs outside Apple’s boundaries, the 
question of organization design shifts, too. Hence, whilst organization design refers to the structuring 
of communication, coordination and control in both closed and open systems, the mechanisms with 
which communication, coordination and control are accomplished in networks are different. 
 
Analytically this raises three distinct questions: First, how is the interaction between actors in 
distributed innovation systems structured? Second, how are production processes designed so that 
distributed actors with different motivations, skills and commitment levels can contribute 
meaningfully? And third, how can actors evaluate the results of distributed innovation and assess its 
qualities?  
 
Principle #1: Interface design   
Hierarchies are communication structures that determine chains of command (down) and lines of 
reporting (up). They are oblivious toward horizontal communication. In contrast, when interacting 
with distributed innovation systems, the task of design is to facilitate horizontal communication 
between network actors, including firms, on the one hand, and external producers in distributed 
innovation systems, on the other.  
 
Organizational design addresses the problem through the design of interfaces. 4 An interface is 
defined as a medium that organizes the exchange between two or more heterarchically distributed 
elements (Galloway, 2012). Interfaces can take many forms: online examples include forums, portals 
                                                 
4 Note that communication in hierarchies is also enabled through interfaces (reports, performance 
reviews, personnel assessments etc. can be read as interfaces). The point of the analysis offered in 
this paper is to explore the specificity of those interfaces that act as filters structuring access to and 
the exchange of information horizontally between two or more elements within distributed 
innovation systems. I would like to thank one of the reviewers for bringing this point to my 
attention.   
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and websites that structure the flow of information and communication; offline, events such as 
conferences or innovation camps provide interfaces between firms and communities; boundary 
objects facilitate interaction between different epistemic communities (Nicolini et al., 2012); and, 
more institutionally, boundary organizations such as the EU-sponsored Living Labs, or consultancies 
such as Hyve, provide structure to the interaction between distributed innovators, including crowds 
and and firms (Almirall and Wareham, 2008; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008). These examples point 
towards the main characteristic of an interface. It acts as a filter that structures access to and the 
exchange of information between two or more elements.5    
 
Analytically, interfaces have several important dimensions. First, as Simon (1969) posited, interfaces 
are “meeting points” mediating between internal and external environments. They structure the 
interaction between different parties by organizing the exchange of information. Consider, for 
example, the interface on email software that allows for three different types of recipients: those 
addressed directly, those copied in and those blind copied. In a subtle yet powerful way, the interface 
structures choice between alternatives. In this sense, interfaces exercise power; they are “architectural 
control points” (Woodward, 2008) that enable and constrain interaction simultaneously. “The 
common interface”, explained Langlois and Garzarelli, “enables, but also governs and disciplines, the 
communication among subsystems” (2005: 9). Interfaces represent often technologically mediated 
affordances that encourage certain actions (e.g. press like button to show support) and make others 
less likely (e.g. expressing dissensus on Facebook).  
 
Second, and closely related, interfaces organize boundaries to enable communication between 
heterarchical subsystems. While extant research has elaborated on the shifting nature and 
                                                 
5 A technical interface is commonly analyzed as standard, which structures exchange within a 
network (e.g. MPG as a technical standard that allows electronic file sharing). Whilst technical 
standards play an important role, this paper focuses on communication interfaces (see Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000).        
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permeability of boundaries (O’Mahoney and Ferraro, 2012; Lakhani et al., 2013; Lifshitz-Assaf, 
2015), a focus on interfaces invites the researcher to zoom into the actual design of boundaries and 
the passages through which information flows. On a micro-level, interfaces may be analyzed as 
formatting devices that govern exchange across boundaries. The notion of formatting captures the 
role of technology and its affordances in structuring communication through interfaces (Orlikowski, 
1992).        
 
Third, and in contradistinction to traditional organizational design, interfaces do not promote 
integration. In distributed innovation systems, the integration of external producers would be 
detrimental, as Chatterji and Fabrizio argued: “If firms attempt to bring users into the firm to capture 
their unique knowledge assets, they risk losing the attributes that make user input valuable in the first 
place” (2012: 984). There are three reasons for the diminishing return of integrating external actors: 
socially, integration means that they grow distant from their network, which has been their source of 
innovation (Powell et al., 1996); cognitively, integrated actors adapt to dominant frames (March, 
1991); and motivationally, contractual obligations and economic incentives might lead to crowding 
out effects (Fehr and Falk, 2002).  
 
The specificity of interfaces resides in their ability to create communication between heterogeneous 
elements while maintaining their differences. Galloway and Thacker (2007) used the notion of 
interoperability to describe how interfaces mediate between dissimilar data forms. The aim of 
mediating interfaces is to create communication across multiplicities without reducing their 
differences; they are mechanisms for translation, not assimilation.   
 
In sum, the concept of interface design expands related concepts of boundary spanning (Aldrich and 
Herker, 1977), brokers (Burt, 1992) and the debate on absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Zahra and George, 2002) in significant ways. An interface represents systematically designed 
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points of interaction between an element (for instance, a firm) and its surrounding network that are: 
(1) meeting points between internal and external elements which (2) translate heterogeneous 
contributions into organizationally readable formats and (3) structure the work and decisions of 
those producing in distributed innovation networks more or less clandestinely.6  
 
A good example of the versatility of interface design is the social networking site Facebook, which 
uses an existing technology (the internet), existing hardware (computers, smartphones, etc.) and 
freely available programming languages (codes) and combines them to create supposedly unique 
value for its users (see Baldwin, 2012: 9). In effect, Facebook’s value-add basically amounts to an 
adept layering of interfaces on top of each other - for what else is Facebook if not a clever nesting of 
interfaces onto a database generated by user activities?      
 
Principle #2: Design of architectures of participation  
Hierarchically organized production is characterized as a grammar to reduce complexity and 
ambiguity (Weick, 1979). Equally, distributed innovation systems rely on a grammar to coordinate 
tasks and integrate outputs. However, in contrast to hierarchical design, the grammar of distributed 
innovation has to allow for distributed actors with varying degrees of motivation, skill and 
commitment levels to contribute to something that emerges without the planning of a managerial 
mastermind. Hence, rather than organizing internal differentiation and integration, architectures of 
participation provide a design mechanism for the integration of external production (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2006; building on Simon, 1962; see also O’Reilly, 2004).  
 
                                                 
6 As one reviewer pointed out, there is a noteworthy parallel to Hayek’s idea that prices 
organize communication horizontally between distributed network actors. Prices may fulfil 
this function in a production-focused (commodity-based) economy. However, in economic 
situations characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity about the value of a new idea, product 
or service the price mechanism fails. Therefore, horizontal communication between 
distributed network actors is accomplished through a plethora of new interfaces and 
evaluative infrastructures that organize supply and demand.       
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Architectures of participation structure the collaboration in distributed innovation systems by 
designing open production processes. Following Baldwin and Clark (2006), these architectures of 
participation refer to three design characteristics that organize collaboration within distributed 
innovation systems. First, modularity refers to the idea that products can be deconstructed into 
modular units and developed independently of each other. This is important as different people with 
different skills may work at different times with different speeds on different aspects of one and the 
same project. The modularity principle echoes Simon’s (1962) idea of a decomposable system in 
which modular units interact with each other through interfaces. The benefit of such a decomposable 
system is higher stability in the face of environmental uncertainty achieved through a loose coupling 
of elements. Second, the principle of granularity states that modules have to be small in size so that a 
given project attracts people with different levels of motivation and commitment (Benkler, 2002). 
For instance, on Wikipedia, rating the usefulness of an entry with a click or researching and writing a 
new entry from scratch illustrate the breadth of possible levels of contribution. Third, low integration 
costs are pivotal as the task of relating modular and granular elements to each other would otherwise 
create costs that outrun the gains achieved through distributed innovation. Integration can occur in 
various forms (Benkler, 2002: 441). For instance, a second order peer-production mechanism can be 
used for the integration of the modular units, as is the case in review-based quality control systems. 
Forms of normative control can act as mechanisms of integration and quality control, such as in the 
case of Wikipedia (see Duguid, 2006 on the limits of self-organization). Other forms of integration 
include technology which can perform the integrative function by specifying conditions of 
integration, or, a temporary return of managerial hierarchy. For instance, Linux developer community 
uses this mechanism for important decisions about system evolution.  
 
Importantly, architectures of participation do not reduce complexity (like traditional organization 
design does), but increase complexity in a controlled way. Lego provides a good example of how a 
simple system that adheres to modularity, granularity and low integration costs can provide the 
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grammar for open-ended creative expression. Indeed, Lego blocks can be understood as a language 
that allows, through grammar and vocabulary, the creation of complex artifacts and experiences 
(Antorini, 2007). Hence, distributed innovation is not limited by the overall complexity of a task, but 
by the modular, granular and integrative characteristics of a given project (Benkler, 2002).  
 
There is a growing number of examples that illustrate the playful application of architectures of 
participation in practice. One of the early examples was the “mole game” developed by the Finnish 
National Library.7 The computer game invited players to build bridges for moles by typing words 
that appear on a screen. The words, instead of being random, were ones the automatic scanning 
program of the Finnish National Library found illegible. Hence, players solved an otherwise costly 
undertaking for the library. Scientists have developed similar gamification strategies to solve 
laborious tasks. For instance, in the game Eyewire, amateur gamers map the connections of the 
nervous system of the eye, while Foldit is an online puzzle in which players fold protein structures.  
 
These examples point towards the importance of an intelligent architecture of participation to enable 
collaboration in distributed networks: in all three cases, complex challenges are broken down into 
tasks that are modular (the problem can be decomposed into small sub-problems), granular (you can 
play once or many times, every input matters) and where integration costs remain low (technology 
collects and processes gaming results). Such a modular, granular and integrative Lego-esque 
architecture provides a language for people to contribute to projects in the “open”. Architectures of 
participation may also impact on the expressiveness and creativity of actors in the distributed 
innovation system, for every language is also always a system of rules (grammar) that structures what 
can be said, and what cannot.   
 
                                                 
7 http://dailycrowdsource.com/20-resources/projects/579-a-game-of-moles-crowdsourcing-the-
archives-of-the-finnish-national-library 
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Principle #3: Design of evaluative infrastructures 
In distributed innovation systems, the most valuable resources for production – know-how and 
human ingenuity – are located outside firm boundaries. Interfaces and effective architectures of 
participation result in a wealth of contributions. In fact, in many distributed innovation networks 
there are too many ideas, products and experiences on offer. Think of websites such as 
kickstarter.com, where to date more than 80,000 projects ranging from fashion to film and music 
have been funded by over eight million investors, pledging more than $US1.6 billion. The problem 
then becomes: how to evaluate innovations and ensure quality control?  
 
Evaluative infrastructures can be defined as methodologies and technologies of valuation that are 
distributed across innovation networks. They are methodologies because they presuppose certain 
epistemological assumptions about what is valuable as well as calculative practices through which 
things can be evaluated (Miller, 2001). They are technologies because they could not exist without a 
plethora of material evaluation devices that measure, quantify, index, compare, fix and calculate 
values (Karpik, 2010). Examples of evaluative infrastructures include, e.g. rankings, ratings, reviews, 
tagging, bestseller lists and awards (see Espeland and Sauder, 2007; Karpik, 2010; Orlikowski and 
Scott, 2014). They can be produced either by users (TripAdvisor or Facebook’s like button), experts 
(awards) or automatically through algorithms (Amazon’s reference function or Google Search). In all 
instances, the “click” plays a pivotal role; it represents a new epistemological category in which 
thinking and action, decision making and execution coincide. And, because every click leaves a trace, 
it provides much of the raw material for evaluative infrastructures.  
 
Evaluative infrastructures evolve in parallel to distributed innovation systems. They fulfill several 
important functions. First, they represent accounting regimes that make things visible (Miller, 2001). 
For instance, trust has been identified as an important characteristic in knowledge intensive 
production processes (Adler, 2001). How do distributed innovators who have never met each other 
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develop trust in each other? Evaluative infrastructures represent technologies that make trust visible. 
For example, the online accommodation provider Airbnb is an interface for people who would like 
to rent out their apartment temporarily and for tourists who would prefer staying in a more personal, 
cheaper home rather than an anonymous, expensive hotel. The service begs the question of trust: 
how can you offer your apartment to someone you have never met? Airbnb’s success is based on its 
solution to this problem, which involves a rating system that creates a reputation for each user. After 
each stay, both parties evaluate each other, which creates a profile that will impact on one’s future 
ability to either rent or lease a flat. The Airbnb co-founder, Nathan Blecharczyk, described reputation 
as the social currency that makes the exchange work.8  
 
More generally, reputation gains are important motivators for contributors to distributed innovation 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Through valuation practices, reputation is made visible, which, in turn, 
motivates members to contribute. Hence, evaluative infrastructures generate a reputation economy 
by providing the scaffolding for people to build their careers in “the open”. An illustrative example 
of this mechanism is TopCoder.com, which hosts competitions between its more than 750,000 
talented programmers and software designers, and connects them with firms that are in need of 
software solutions (see Boudreau et al., 2011). Top coders’ achievements are displayed on the 
website, the quality of the coders’ reputations indicated by badges awarded according to a “progress 
meter”. Through such visualizations, evaluations allow the build-up of cultural and symbolic capital.  
 
Evaluative infrastructures do not merely make values visible; they are also constitutive of new values. 
Having a certain number of followers in an online network such as Twitter is a new form of social 
value that is inextricably linked to the technology that allows for its visualization. Reference tools, 
such as Amazon’s “If you like books by [author’s name], you might like …”, create new 
cartographies of products, bestowing forms of symbolic and cultural value upon them by relating 
                                                 
8 Interview in Die Zeit, no. 34, August 16, 2012, p. 28. 
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them. The networking site LinkedIn asks its users to tag (“endorse”) members in their network, 
making qualities visible that constitute new profiles. Hence evaluative infrastructures engender new 
forms of accounting for multiple values. They are mechanisms to quantify qualities and coin new 
currencies, such as trust quantified as grade on a scale (AirBnB) or an overall sellers rating (eBay). In 
so doing they do not simply measure, but actively co-constitute new values.     
 
In effect evaluative infrastructures play an important role in organizing sense-making and decision-
making. As argued, distributed innovation invites a wealth of proposals, prototypes and products that 
are launched continuously. The question is how to navigate these productions that no-one asked for 
and how to find those that are valuable and reliable. In a hierarchical system selection is based on a-
priori defined criteria; in distributed innovation networks, selection is based on a-posteriori 
evaluations (Benkler, 2006).  Rankings, ratings and other evaluation devices represent regimes of 
valuation that categorize and hierarchize products emerging from distributed innovation systems. 
Virtually anything (downloads, citations, references, etc.) can serve as raw material for valuations. 
And, since everything leaves a trace, virtually every activity can be translated into an input for a 
higher-level evaluation (e.g. papers feed citation analyses, which feed the h-index, etc.). These 
cascades of valuations create (at least temporarily stable) taxonomies that allow for users to make 
sense and decision. As Karpik (2010) put it, valuation devices are cognitive prosthesis that help 
consumers through an increasingly complex world. Put simply, evaluative infrastructures emerge at 
the point where the scare resource is the cognitive capacity to weigh alternatives. In fact, Apple’s 
App Store ranks Apps that are hip, TripAdvisor suggests where to eat and sleep, and Google 
proposes the most relevant answer to a particular inquiry; in each of these three instances, evaluative 
infrastructures categorize and hierarchize otherwise overwhelming amount of new products, idea and 
experiences and through doing so support sense- and decision-making.    
 
Discussion 
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Reconfiguring organization design in distributed innovation systems  
As scholars from a variety of fields have suggested, given modern communication technology and a 
wealth of new organizational forms, the locus of innovation shifts from firms to open networks. This 
paper suggests a framework for the study of how organization design accomplishes communication, 
coordination and control in such networks. Interfaces, architectures of participation, and evaluative 
infrastructures represent the design mechanisms that organize network interaction and transaction.  
 
This framework advances organization design’s traditional analytical vocabulary. To date, 
organization design scholars have not responded sufficiently to the challenges and opportunities of 
this shift towards distributed innovation (Dunbar and Starbuck, 2006). Foundational work from the 
middle of the last century is still providing the vocabularies for current debates (March and Simon, 
1958; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For 
instance, Chandler proposed understanding structure as, “the design of the organization through 
which the enterprise is administered” (1962: 14), including internal hierarchical structuring of 
organization, division of labor (differentiation and integration), managerial control and performance 
measurement systems (see also Altman et al., 2015). The key concern is to create “fit” between 
exogenous forces and what is treated as internal variables, such as people, architectures, routines and 
culture (Roberts, 2004). But when economic activity is organized outside the boundaries of 
hierarchically organized firms, managers may have little or no jurisdiction over those variables and 
the performance of those who were neither hired by them nor can be fired by them.  
 
The contribution that this paper makes is to show how organization design can be conceptualized as 
a novel form of structuring communication, coordination and control in distributed innovation 
systems. The key tenet of this paper is that distributed innovation systems are characterized by three 
specific design parameters: In the first place, interfaces structure interaction within distributed 
innovation systems; in the second place, architectures of participation provide a language through 
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which network innovators with varying degrees of commitment, motivation and skills can articulate 
their contributions; and finally evaluative infrastructures encompass rankings, ratings and a myriad of 
other evaluation devices through which products are being compared, commensurated and 
categorized.  
 
Most importantly, the primary function of organization design in distributed innovation systems is 
not to actually organize production or to innovate, but to provide the conditions in which distributed 
innovators can do so. To return to the example of Ford: At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Ford’s assembly line provided an internalized infrastructure that organized production. The 
knowledge economy requires a different kind of infrastructure, one that invites distributed actors to 
contribute and co-create. The assembly line is, so to speak, folded from the inside of the firm out 
onto the innovation network. This infrastructure does not enforce internal hierarchy but consists of 
multiple nested interfaces mediating between heterarchically organized, heterogeneous subsystems; it 
does not differentiate and integrate tasks internally, but offers a language for external actors to 
become co-authors of novel ideas, products and technologies; it does not strive for assimilation but 
represents a mechanism for translation; and, finally, it does not directly control those who produce 
but provides evaluative infrastructures that order and hierarchize what is produced in “the open”.  
 
Implications for theory   
Design as mechanism to organize “the open” has some further implications for theories of search 
and the resource-based view.  
 
First, theorizing the “visible hand” and the “crowd” transforms the organizational search problem 
(March, 1991). Researchers have repeatedly argued that outstanding organizational performance 
results form strategic leaders’ “superior ability to manage the mental processes necessary to pursue 
cognitively distant opportunities” (Gavetti, 2012: 267). Yet, a well-established body of literature has 
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evolved over the decades that shows management’s structural problems with search. For instance, 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) argued that power dynamics determine resource allocation, making 
organizations paradoxically fit to respond to threats but, in the long run, unfit to cope with new 
challenges. March described the “competency trap” (Levitt and March, 1988) which results from 
successful past experience. Experience, he argued, “is likely to generate confidence more reliably than 
it generates competence and to stop experimentation too soon” (March, 2010: 114). Because core 
competencies easily become “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992), today’s success may breed 
tomorrow’s failure.  
 
The proposed framework shifts the question of search as an experiential and cognitive task (Gavetti 
and Levinthal, 2000) towards search as a distributed process facilitated by organizational design. 
Distributed innovation systems are comprised of a large number of actors with different needs, 
competencies and objectives. The actors are distributed heterachically and, each conditioned by their 
own bounded rationalities, perform searches for new ideas according to their own evaluation criteria. 
In other words, search is performed amongst a variety of distributed actors who have their own 
definition of what counts (Stark, 2009). But what structures such a seemingly chaotic search process? 
The proposed theory of design suggests three organizing principles for such searches. Organization 
design in distributed innovation systems explicates: 1) how contending search filters can interact via 
interfaces; 2) how individual actors can build onto each others’ contributions; and 3) how different 
valuations come about.  
 
In regards to search, the last point deserves special emphasis. Evaluative infrastructures are epistemic 
machines that scan open networks for different values, monitoring, comparing and visualizing them. 
From Facebook’s like button to TopCoder’s reputation hierarchies and Amazon’s cross-referencing 
categorization system, these and other mechanisms have to be understood as evaluation tools that 
monitor how orders of worth emerge. Hence, evaluative infrastructures represent “heterogeneous 
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systems of accounting for worth” (Stark 2009: 25), which are in and of themselves valuable, as Stark 
elaborated, “Where the organizational environment is turbulent and there is uncertainty what might 
constitute a resource under changed conditions, contending frameworks of value can themselves be a 
valuable organizational resource” (2009: 6).  
 
Second, the arguments put forward in this paper have implications for the resource-based view of the 
firm. The resource-based view suggests that sustainable competitive advantage is rooted in an 
organization’s specific resources, competencies and capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; Teece et al. 1997). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) suggested the metaphor of 
a tree, where products and services resemble the leaves exposed to the wind and weather, but where 
the true “roots of competitiveness” are to be found in the core competencies, hidden deep down in 
the soil, the roots storing away a firm’s main resource (knowledge). However, the image of roots as 
representing an organization’s most valuable assets is misleading; rather, knowledge is distributed 
across networks and located outside organizational boundaries. Hence, it is not ownership or other 
forms of direct control over resources that bestows a competitive advantage on firms, but rather 
access to resources (Rifkin, 2000). For strategy, this raises the question: How can access be 
organized? This paper has identified three mechanisms that can facilitate access to resources outside 
firm boundaries. Interface design organizes access and exchange between heterachically organized 
subsystems; architectures of participation provide the language (alphabet and grammar) to co-author 
innovative narratives and ideas; and evaluative infrastructures represent ordering mechanisms that 
classify, categorize and hierarchize co-created products and services. Moreover, evaluative 
infrastructures make visible resources such as talent (TopCoder), reputation (reviews on Airbnb) or 
trust (eBay) which are in turn the crucial inputs for further strategic thought and action (see for the 
example of eBay Baron, 2001; Saeedi et al., 2013). In short, the proposed analytics of organization 
design in distributed innovation systems contributes to the resource-based view by explicating how 
external resources can be identified, coordinated, and to some degree, governed.  
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These suggestions have implications for the debate between strategy and structure more generally.  
Under conditions of a distributed resource base, it can be hypothesized that strategy does not 
determine structure, but that an organization’s interface design, participatory architecture and 
evaluative infrastructures determine its strategic options. By extension, organizational design is not a 
question of fit, but a generative force that creates new possibilities. To return to Prahalad and 
Hamel’s metaphor, the competencies of a firm are not its roots; competencies reside in its ability to 
design interfaces between externally situated know-how; to provide architectures for meaningful 
conversation and collaboration; and to develop evaluative infrastructures to make contributions 
visible and valuable.  
 
Implications for further empirical research  
This paper’s conceptual vocabulary invites to broaden the empirical research agenda of scholars 
studying the strategic organization of distributed innovation systems.  
     
Following Baldwin’s (2012) call this paper provided a conceptualization of organization design that 
does not take the individual firm but the network as unit of analysis. It suggests studying interfaces, 
participatory architectures and evaluative infrastructures as pivotal design mechanisms that structure 
communication, coordination of tasks and control in distributed innovation systems. Future 
empirical research might focus on concrete enactments of these design mechanisms in practice: How 
do interfaces format the flow, direction and density of information in distributed innovation 
networks?  How do these interfaces as architectural control points facilitate translations across 
boundaries, and what is lost in translation? How are modularity, granularity and low integration costs 
accomplished in networks? In how far do participatory architectures (akin to languages) pre-
configure network actors’ experiences of the present and imagination of possible futures? How do 
evaluative infrastructures commensurate, categorize and hierarchize the contributions of network 
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actors, establishing new orders of worth? And how do these evaluations inform sense-making and 
decision-making of network actors, consumers and other stakeholders? Such empirical research into 
organization design of networks needs to be complemented with a focus on the specific affordances 
of technology: how does technology, including devices, applications, software, algorithms, etc. 
structure the space of possible actions of network actors? Such empirical inquiry into the 
organization design in networks will also produce insights into the relationships between actual 
organization designs and networks’ innovation capacity and overall agility.  
 
Last but not least the suggested conceptualization of organization design in distributed innovation 
systems invites further empirical analysis of the question of authorship of designs. Avoiding firm-
centricity, future research might analyse authorship of interfaces, participatory architectures and 
evaluative infrastructures as distributed phenomenon. Authors may include, but are not limited to, 
firms that seek to impose their designs on the “crowd” as well as actors, such as entrepreneurs, 
collectives and others that play significant roles in the emergence and ongoing evolution of designs. 
Bringing in a temporal, dynamic perspective, over time authors’ roles might range from active co-
designers to users that appropriate dominant designs through their (performative) routines, bending 
and sometimes breaking design rules.    
 
Concluding reflections  
Theorizing organization design between the “visible hand” and the “crowd” invites a concluding 
speculation. As Drucker (2002) argued, management is perhaps the most important socio-technical 
invention of the twentieth century. Management’s legitimacy is based on its efficiency claim, and thus 
managers, at least theoretically, are held accountable for how the organization performs.  
 
Distributed innovation challenges this theoretization of the manager. In the context of distributed 
innovation, the manager does not have formal authority over the production process. The 
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legitimizing claim of efficiency gains through managerial coordination cannot be upheld either. 
Rather, unruly producer-consumers and other external agents whom the manager can neither hire 
nor fire are valuable yet also uncontrollable organizational resources. In this context, the managerial 
challenge shifts from being focused on the efficient allocation of internal resources to a concern with 
organizing “the open”, i.e. designing structures and systems for coordinating work outside company 
walls (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2013).  
 
How, then, can we rethink the role of the manager? Perhaps managing could be re-imagined as 
practice of diplomacy, with diplomacy defined as the “attempt to govern the ungovernable – the 
anarchical society – through discursive and cultural practices” (Der Derian, 1987:4). Diplomacy is a 
potentially fruitful metaphor for describing management in “the open” because, historically, the 
power of diplomacy evolved in inverse relation to the demise of the power of the sovereign. Foreign 
cultures had to be decoded diplomatically because they could not any longer be firmly oppressed or 
safely ignored. In other words, diplomacy marks the sovereign’s tacit acknowledgement that the 
world is polycentric. The disaggregation of authority into multiple “spheres of authority” (Rosenau, 
2007; 1997) might not only characterize international but also organizational relations. In open 
networks characterized by shifting alliances, dispersed leadership, distributed agency and multiple 
authorship, the manager’s tasks might start resembling that of a diplomat, as both are concerned with 
creating the conditions for collective action to occur.  
 
Following from that, and emphasizing the Galbraith quote cited at the beginning of this paper, it is 
not ideological debates for or against capitalism that matter; rather, it is the imperatives of technology 
and organization that shape society. New practices of value creation in distributed innovation 
networks and new design mechanisms to organize “the open” may represent part and parcel of such 
imperatives. Whether or not distributed innovation represents a new form of organizing economic 
activity or merely an attempt to hollow out bureaucracies; whether it will lead to groupthink on an 
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unprecedented scale or valuable new ideas; whether it will debunk the expert and install a regime of 
populism instead, these questions will depend at least partly on how distributed innovation comes to 
be integrated into existing circuits of production and power. For better or worse, organization design 
as a mechanism to structure the interaction between the “visible hand” and the “crowd” will play a 
crucial role in these attempts to organize (and perhaps to disorganize) “the open”.     
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